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«I HOPE THAT POLICY MAKERS TAKE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD 
A NEW RUSSIA WITH MORE ROBUST AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH»
Th e Interview of the SPSU World Economy Department Head Professor 
Sergei F. Sutyrin and Associate Professor of SPSU Victor V. Lukashevich with 
Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) at 
the Stockholm School of Economics Dr. Torbjörn Becker1 
S. S., V. L. Dear Dr. Becker, fi rst of all let us express our gratitude for your kind consent to share some 
of your ideas with the readers of our journal. We would like to start with asking about your attitude to the 
up-to-now state of the current Russian economy? Do you regard it as one in a state of a deep long-lasting 
structural crisis or as one simply having some temporary structural problems?
T. B. Before discussing the current state of the Russian economy, I think it is important to highlight 
the very good economic performance Russia enjoyed in the 2000’s before the global economic crisis 
hit many countries in 2008/9. In the decade following the 1998 crisis, GDP per capita in constant 
2005 dollar terms almost doubled according to World Bank data. Th is amount to a healthy 6.5 percent 
per annum growth rate in constant dollar income, which meant that Russia during this decade made 
signifi cant progress in closing the income gap relative to Western high income countries. It also meant 
a signifi cant boost to domestic purchasing power that translated into an expansion of retail trade and 
services as well as signifi cant investments by companies.
However, this strong growth performance was strongly correlated with rapidly increasing real 
international oil prices. During the same period from 1999 to 2008, real oil prices increased by more 
than fi ve times! (Figure 1).
Th is correlation can be shown also in a simple OLS regression over a longer time period of 17 years 
where annual Russian GDP growth is regressed on changes in international oil prices and an intercept. 
Th e regression has an R-square of over 60 percent, which is not bad for a one-variable macro model. 
1 Torbjörn Becker has been Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) at 
the Stockholm School of Economics since August 2006. He is also a board member of several research, 
education and policy institutes in Eastern Europe that are part of the regional network Forum for Research 
on Eastern Europe and Emerging Economies (FREE) as well as the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida). Prior to this he worked for nine years at the International Monetary Fund. 
His academic and policy work covers international macro and fi nance issues and has been published in 
top-ranking international journals and in several books and reports. He holds a PhD in economics from 
the Stockholm School of Economics and has also studied at the University of California, Berkeley and Man-
chester Business School.
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A look at the estimated coeffi  cients in this “model” suggests that a 10 percent increase in oil prices has 
been associated with roughly a 1.5 percent increase in GDP growth, while the growth without changes 
in oil prices (the intercept in the regression) is estimated at slightly above 2 percent.
Sometimes the strong correlation between oil prices changes and GDP growth is not well under-
stood because the decomposition of GDP growth shows that it is domestic demand rather than net 
exports that have made the greatest contributions to growth. Th e argument is then that the low share 
of oil, gas and minerals in the productions side of GDP together with the demand side decomposition 
suggest that the extraction sectors in general and oil in particular has lost in importance when it comes 
to explaining income growth in Russia.
Although there has been a strong growth in domestic demand, this has in turn been driven by in-
creases in oil income. Oil income in turn has mainly increased because of increases in international 
oil prices rather than in increases in Russian production volumes. Because of the limited increases in 
production volumes, this does not appear to be an important factor in real income growth. However, it 
is the increased incomes from oil (and gas) that allowed consumption and investment to grow so fast, 
which was linked to strong growth in imports. Th is can easily be seen by the correlation between GDP 
growth and changes in imports. In the national accounting identity, imports enter with a negative sign, 
so if it were the case that there were no second round eff ects from increases in imports, the correlation 
with GDP would be negative. However, imports in turn increase domestic consumption and investment 
(in countries that are more integrated than Russia in global value chains, it is oft en also an important 
input in the production of goods that are then exported). Th e consumption and investment of imported 
goods in turn generates locally produces goods and services. For example, if a foreign car is imported, 
it also leads to a Russian fi rm selling the car, servicing the car, selling fuel to the car and so on. In other 
words, a dollar worth of imports may lead to two dollars worth of domestic consumption and/or invest-
ments. But without the foreign exchange earning that comes with increasing oil prices, there will be less 
imports of foreign cars and thus the extra domestic goods and services that come with imports are also 
lost in the GDP calculation. Th is dynamic associated with imports is not unique to Russia, but a factor of 
any economy involved in foreign trade and an important reason why trade has benefi ts to the economy 
beyond the immediate imported good itself. At the same time, it comes with a risk of falling GDP when 
imports contract at a pace that it cannot be replace by domestic production (Figure 2). 
Figure 1. Russian GDP per capita and oil prices
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Figure 2. Scatter plot of GDP growth and changes in imports (quarterly growth rates from q1 2004 to 
q2 2014 м)
Figure 3. Oil prices, rouble and stock market moving in tandem (index values set to 100 in 
January 2014)
Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 5. Экономика. 2016. Вып. 1 109
Turning to the current state of the Russian economy, it is clear that the downturn in oil prices 
have had serious eff ects on Russia, including on the Russian ruble, stock market, imports and the real 
economy. Since the beginning of 2014, international oil prices have declined by more than 50 percent, 
the ruble has halved its value against the dollar, and the stock market (RTS index) has seen a drop of 
almost 40 percent (Figure 3). 
Th e real eff ects can be seen in imports and GDP. Imports have fallen dramatically and in the recent 
quarters, there has been a decline of around 40 percent. Th is is the same order of magnitude as was 
seen in the worst quarters of the global fi nancial crisis in 2008/9. Th e impact on GDP has been less 
pronounced than it was then, but the question is if this signifi es a structural shift  in the relationship 
between GDP growth and imports or is a result of interventions that may not be sustainable over time 
(Figure 4).
Figure 4. GDP growth and changes in imports over time
Aft er this long introduction, the answer to the question is not too surprising. Th e current econom-
ic problems come to a large extent from Russia’s heavy dependence on oil revenues. What is notable is 
that to generate economic growth, it is not suffi  cient that oil prices are high, but they actually have to 
increase at a relatively rapid pace to generate signifi cant growth. As was seen in the simple regression, 
a 10 percent increase in oil prices led to 1.5 percent GDP growth. Th is is a point that is not always well 
understood. Many argue that as soon as oil prices return to a certain level, let’s say 100 dollars per bar-
rel, everything will be fi ne. Th at has not been the case in the past. It is only in years when international 
oil prices have shown double digit increases that Russian GDP growth has been strong enough for 
Russia to reduce the income gap compared with high-income countries. 
Serious reform discussions that will allow Russia to generate high growth without increasing oil 
prices also only seem to take place when oil prices decline and the discussions then die out as oil prices 
increase again. Since the needed structural reforms are rather extensive, they will take time to imple-
ment, so this on-off  approach to reforms is not generating a good ground for sustainable reforms and 
economic growth. My interpretation is therefore that the current crisis is a result of a fundamental 
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structural challenge, which is related to the reliance on oil income and lack of long-term commitment 
to change this by implementing far-reaching institutional reforms. 
However, the current problems may obviously disappear if oil prices once again increase sharply 
due to global developments that aff ect oil prices and to a large extent are beyond the control of Russian 
policy makers. Th is could then be interpreted as if the crisis is cyclical rather than structural, but the 
problem is that international oil prices are not set by Russia, which means that Russian policy makers 
are not in control of the cycle in any substantial way. Of course, the fi scal reserves and a fl exible 
exchange rate will help mitigate the impact of oil price fl uctuations, but will not tackle to root course 
of Russia’s economic volatility. 
S. S., V. L. What to your opinion should be urgently done in current Russian macroeconomic, trade, 
and FDI policies to improve the current situation?
T. B. Based on the above discussion, I think the current policy of letting the exchange rate adjust 
in line with changes in international oil prices have been key as a way of reducing the real eff ects on 
GDP and maintaining fi scal sustainability. Using some of the fi scal reserves is also motivated given the 
challenges the economy is facing. 
However, the crisis has been deepened by other factors than oil prices that have also hurt 
investment fl ows, both from international and Russian investors. In particular, the sanctions that have 
come with the confl ict in Ukraine has added to the uncertainty and costs associated with investing in 
Russia today, and taking steps that would allow sanctions to be removed would be an important way 
to facilitate investments and generate economic growth. 
In addition, there are reforms that should be undertaken to improve the business climate in 
general. Russia has made signifi cant improvements in its business climate that have boosted its Doing 
Business ranking, but trading across borders is still in need of much reforms. Given how modern 
manufacturing is organized today, with global value chains and multinationals that produce and sell 
goods across a wide set of countries, having signifi cant obstacles to trading across boarders is a serious 
impediment to many large-scale investments.
S. S., V. L. Some time ago (September 7–8, 20 15) Dr. Sergey Glaziev, President Putin’s economic 
counselor, has formulated in the media a series of interconnected recommendations concerning the 
changes necessary and urgent in Russian internal macroeconomic policies. Some of these seem just too 
radical for many experts, others meet practically general approval. We can regard these proposals made 
public as a beginning of a broad public discussion. Could you make some brief comments on Dr. Sergey 
Glaziev`s program (starting from the proposal of freezing the retail prices to a deep reform of monetary 
and fi scal policy of Russia)?
T. B. I will start by stating that I am clearly in the camp of economists that think that a well 
functioning market economy beats central planning every day, year, decade and century. Th is is not 
about political ideology, but simply based on observations of economic performance over a long time 
period and across many countries. And this is despite the fact that the perfect market economy does 
not exist anywhere in the world. Th e challenge is therefore not to create a perfect market economy but 
rather to create a reasonably well functioning market economy, since this will still be superior to any 
actual example of central planning. 
In my reading of the proposals of Dr. Glaziev, I think the vast majority of proposals are in the 
direction of more central planning and less of creating a well functioning market. Th erefore, I do not 
think this is the right direction of reforms for Russia. What is lacking today in Russia is not too much 
market but too little. A well functioning market economy where individuals and companies are free 
to capitalize on ideas and investment in a predictable institutional environment that is open to free 
exchange with the rest of the world should be the goal of economic policy. It is easy to come up with 
other plans and ideas in a crisis, since many people and companies are then suff ering, but in the long-
run, a return to a centrally planned system would severely reduce growth and welfare.
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S. S., V. L. You mention in your publications on Russia the so called “confi dence collapse”. Could you 
specify your understanding of this phenomenon?
T. B. Th e confi dence collapse is really what is illustrated in Figure 3 where the simultaneous decline 
in oil prices, the rouble and the stock market is shown. In addition, the stock market is also responding 
to developments in Ukraine and associated sanctions, which have put further pressure on both trade 
and fi nancial fl ows. Taken together, the decline in oil prices and sanctions have made it very hard 
for investors to maintain confi dence in the Russian economy in this time period. Confi dence will be 
restored when oil prices increase and/or sanctions regime is lift ed or eased. It would also be helped by 
structural reforms as discussed above.
S. S., V. L. What is your general attitude to the problem of migrant workers from CIS countries in 
Russia?
T. B. I would think that both Russia and the migrant workers have a lot to benefi t from a good 
relationship. Th e migrant workers are in Russia because it provides them with better opportunities to 
earn an income than if they stayed in their home country and Russian fi rms and consumers benefi t 
from having access to a larger work force. Th e incomes sent home by migrant workers also contribute 
signifi cantly to the welfare of the countries where they come from and the people at home that are 
themselves not working in Russia. In other words, the benefi ts go beyond the people that are in Russia. 
Th ere may be social issues related to migrant workers, which is not an issue I have studied and I have 
therefore little to contribute to this discussion. 
S. S., V. L. Imagine, you are a solid “Russian economy optimist”… How could you briefl y substantiate 
the logical basis for your optimism?
T. B. I am a Russian economy optimist! I do think that Russia has too many valuable resources 
not to succeed in the long term. Russia has a well-educated work force in many important areas; vast 
natural resources; a prime location for trade between east and west; and long history of dealing with 
diff erent types of challenges. Th e key to unlocking the potential of the Russian economy is with the 
Russian policy makers who should focus on generating opportunities for individuals and companies. 
If this is done, Russia will be an even more signifi cant and infl uential economic player not only in its 
immediate neighborhood but also on a global level.
S. S., V. L. Imagine, you are a solid “Russian economy pessimist”… How could you briefl y substantiate 
the logical basis for your skepticism?
T. B. If the focus is on the short run, I can imagine myself in the camp of economic pessimists 
since the outlook for a sharp increase in oil prices that would bring Russia out of the crisis quickly 
is not really in the cards. Although there have been some moves in the direction that may eventually 
ease sanctions, this is also unlikely to change very soon and thus contributes to a gloomy picture in 
the short run. 
Th e main concern for the longer-run is that the needed reforms discussed previously, which 
are related to building solid and predictable market institutions, have been discussed many times 
but progress remains slow. Th en President Medvedev formulated an ambitious reform program in 
2009 that had most of the needed reforms listed, but as soon as oil prices turned up in 2010, these 
were to a large extent left  undone. A Russian economic pessimist may therefore say that the interest 
in reforms is just as the economy very strongly correlated with oil prices, and given the volatility in oil 
prices, it is hard to see a reform program that will take years to implement succeed in an era of very 
volatile oil prices. 
However, I hope this pessimistic view is proven wrong and that policy makers in Russia today take 
this opportunity to build a new Russia with more robust and sustainable growth that is not hostage to 
the volatility of international oil prices. 
